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BREZHNEV'S ECONOMIC CHOICE:
MORE WEAPONS AND CONTROL OR ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION
by
DOCTOR JOHN P. HARDT

At the December 1969 Plenum of the
Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), Leonid
Brezhnev made it a matter of record that
improved economic performance was a first
order agenda item for the Party. From that
date to the once postponed 24th Party
Congress in March 1971 a Soviet style policy
debate appeared to rage on the contents of
the Ninth Five-Year Plan for the period
197 1-75 inclusive. The discussions ranged
from considerations implying a return to the
Stalinist heavy industry-military priority to a
shift in priority toward the civilian-growth
o r i e n t e d economy, i.e., economic
modernization.
Technological change is given a featured
place in the Ninth Five-Year Plan directives
signed personalIy by Leonid Brezhnev.1 One
of the plan's most explicit commitments
toward technological change and economic
modernization relates to the improvement in
energy utilization; specifically, increases in

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary o f the Central
Committee o f the CPSU, delivering the opening report
to the twenty-fourth Congress on March 30, 1971.

t h e use of petroleum, natural gas,
hydroelectric, and atomic energy. This
improvement in the energy balance is
designed to raise economic efficiency and
replace coal as a major source of energy
supply for electric power generation and
other industrial and communal needs. Central
to the attainment of this energy supply
improvement is the ambitious plan for
developing the West Siberian Tyumen
petroleum development in the next Five-Year
Plan. An increase of some 100 million tons to
make the new area the primary source of
petroleum supply by 1975 illustrates its
importance and ambitious character.
The increase in civilian investment to meet
the development needs of the West Siberian
d e v e l o p m e n t raises the question of
competition with military claimants for scarce
resources. In the past there has been an
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the plan is evident. Or if commitments have
been postponed, we may only know about
priority changes after the leadership has made
its choices.

inverse relationship between military increases
a n d r e s o u r c e s a l l o c a t e d t o civilian
investments. Similarly, manpower shortages
highlight the competition of military and
civilian claimants for scarce manpower.
L a b o r , unless p r o d u c t i v i t y increases
markedly, is likely to inhibit the fulfillment
of the ambitious goals for expansion in the
Soviet civilian economy. The feasibility of the
Ninth Five-Year Plan would be materially
enhanced by release of able bodied males
from the uniformed forces. Indeed, when
Nikita Khrushchev at the 21st Party Congress
discussed the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65)
oriented toward economic modernization and
Siberian development, he was following a
policy of reducing the priority of weapons
p r o g r a m s a n d d e m o b i l i z i n g military
manpower. Brezhnev may have made the
same judgment in 1971, although it was not
so indicated at the Party Congress. In 1961
when Khrushchev reversed the policy favoring
civilian investment and manpower, the
industrial growth rate slowed down. Fortified
by the reaction to the Cuban missile crisis, the
Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev leadership
favored weapons procurement and retention
of military manpower throughout the decade
of the sixties.
The difficulty in assessing a change in
priority between military and civilian
programs is that only the plan for the civilian
economy is discussed in public, and that only
partially, Marshal Zhukov, in his recent
memoirs, refers explicitly to the First and
Second Five-Year Plan for the Red armies for
the period 1929-33 and 1934-38.2 Marshal
Zhukov, currently Chief of the General Staff
and First Deputy of the Ministry of Defense,
notes in referring to the Third Military Plan
(1938-42) that it was personally approved by
Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov. 3
The context of Marshal Zakharov's current
reference further supports our view that the
same dual publication of civilian and military
Five-Year Plan directives may still be in effect
as in the Stalinist period. Without the
availability of the military part of the Ninth
Five-Year Plan, it may only be possible to
make clear judgments on priorities after the
resource allocation pattern of several years of

POST KHRUSHCHEV ECONOMIC POLICY

D u r i n g t h e post-Khrushchev years
1964-1968 (i.e., up to the December 1969
p l e n u m ) , c o n t i n u e d overall economic
development and an absence of severe
agricultural crises have produced a surface
appearance of calm in the Soviet economy.
Defense allocations have apparently been
given a top budgetary priority during this
period, with a special emphasis on strategic
systems but also a general increase across the
spectrum of military preparedness. A partial
result of this heavy military emphasis has
been deemphasis of civilian investment, which
has deferred—but not solved—a number of
serious problems in economic performance,
including too-slow modernization of industry
(and the corollary failure to expand use of
rich Siberian industrial resources, which
w o u l d p e r m i t further modernization);
insufficient improvement in agricultural
productivity; inadequate consumer goods and
h o u s i n g availability; and a resulting
dampening of growth-stimulating activity in
the Soviet economy.
It seems unlikely that the apparent absence
of high-level debate on economic policy and
moderate economic performance of this postKhrushchev period would continue. If the
country's economic growth remains at a low
level—as is expected—the strain on available
resources would become greater, and changes
in policy to stimulate growth might be
forthcoming. The year 1969 was a poor crop
year. Although 1970 was better, poor weather
years are likely to follow. This would put
serious pressures on the economy. Moreover,
the costs of the commitment to the military
and of deferred investment in growth sectors
may become increasingly evident. The cycle
of economic performance common to East
European Soviet-type economies may become
more evident in the Soviet economy. Most
pronounced in construction and agriculture,
this cycle may spread to industrial output.
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The Soviet economy is likely, if the downturn
is severe, to find economic performance a
factor influencing sharp revisions in resource
allocation—especially from defense to
investment—and a significant increase in the
permissive environment for economic reform.
The severity of economic downturn could
result from a coincidence of poor weather, an
i n c r e a s i n g awareness of resource
overcommitment in nongrowth-stimulating
sectors, and an adverse foreign trade situation.
As the leadership cannot defer painful
economic choices indefinitely, it seems useful
to investigate the framework within which
economic choices may be perceived even now,
and the alternatives—although they are not
explicitly reflected in current policy—that are
likely to be future options.
Major changes in resource allocation
decisions result largely from Party discussions
within the Soviet elite among groups
representing institutional-professional, or
modernist-reactionary inter- and intra-group
combinations. Public challenges to Party
e c o n o m i c p o l i c y , muted during the
1964-1969 period, began to be expressed
again after the December 1969 Plenum. With
the clear priority assigned to military
allocations, the military has not had to
advance its arguments publicly as strongly as
during the Khrushchev period at times when
the trend of allocations was against them.
There are, however, challenges to policy-on
i n v e s t m e n t decisions, military budgets,
e c o n o m i c r e f o r m i n p l a n n i n g and
management, etc.--being voiced in the
1969-1 971 period. Voices appear to be
making the case, albeit with limited success so
far, for civilian priorities in national life:
agricultural investment, modern industry,
Siberian development, urban development,
housing, roads, cars, etc. As such demands
proliferate and are more forcefully pressed,
the debate on resource allocation is apt to
become sharper and perhaps even more
openly critical, if economic growth slows.
Concomitant with the pressure to make
economic choices among alternative claimants
is the increasing ability to evaluate the
choices. The trend toward optimal planning
and market-simulating management, including

increased use of tools such as input-output
analysis and linear programing, the greater
a p p l i c a t i o n of computers, and some
improvement in statistical procedures, seems
geared to a felt need of the leadership to have
better data on which to base their choices.
The issue aligns the economic professional
against the Party functionary. In this debate
the economic and military professionals may
find common cause. How to formulate
economic plans to implement party policy
and how to choose among military weapons
systems to meet requirements of given
missions are technical and professional tasks
b e s t p e r f o r m e d by t h e professional
institutional groups rather than the party
bureaucrats, it may be argued.
It is possible to identify some terms of the
challenges to the extant but modified Stalinist
resource priorities and economic system and
the alternatives, as the Soviet leaders are
coming to view them, and draw inferences as
to Soviet policy options from some of the
specific cases. The two general categories of
issues may be summarized as follows:
(1) Guns vs economic modernization or
growth, i.e., military vs civilian investment
and growth-stimulating consumption.
(2) Control vs efficiency, i.e., Party control
vs elite pluralism, professionalism, efficiency.
On the guns vs growth issue it may be
noted that defense expenditures have always
occupied high priority in their claims on the
quantity and particularly quality of resources.
Economic progress is, however, closely tied to
growth-stimulating civilian investment and to
a lesser e x t e n t to growth-stimulating
consumption that provides civilian incentive.
Rising capital-output ratios and unsatisfactory
improvement in labor productivity even in
times of moderate growth call for more and
better resource allocation to stimulate
growth. If an economic downturn occurs, the
call may become urgent. The simple resource
relation between guns and growth then is that
defense programs are the only significant
source of resources that could be shifted to
growth-stimulating programs.
On the control vs efficiency issue, the
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been put on a Khozraschet (cost accounting)
system.5 There is also an increasing awareness
and open reference to the interrelations
between military and civilian requirements.6
Mr. Brezhnev noted in his speech to the
Congress that 42 percent of the defense
facilities would produce consumer goods in
the new planning period. This may not only
represent a weakness in the civilian economy
but a less efficient defense supporting
industry .7

Soviet statistical reporting system provides
indications of progress or success at best in
disjointed fashion and in crude physical
output terms. Data useful in providing a
reliable common value denominator of choice
among alternative economic means for
attaining prescribed ends are unavailable. The
current reforms in planning and management
highlight the Party's groping for more
efficient means of directing the economy. The
term "optimal planning" is used to cover a
wide range of changes that would be
necessary to produce economic efficiency: it
involves an economy-wide setting of goals in
all sectors, with a realistic assessment and
allocation of scarce resources. It requires, by
comparison with the old system, (a) better
data; (b) a different method of using data in
the planning process, including the use of
computers and sophisticated mathematical
techniques; and (c) a different set of
priorities, reflecting a changed distribution of
power, as a result of which competitive
s o u r c e s o f p o w e r influence the
decisionmaking process. Meaningful economic
reform at the enterprise level involves a
transition from the Stalinist-type control of
p r o d u c t i o n a n d s u p p l y t o a new
demand-oriented system constrained by
measures such as sales, costs, and profits. The
development of such integrated, optimal
planning (as contrasted with piecemeal
maximal planning) would have significant
implications for economic efficiency. The
professional base for a change in planning has
been laid with the development of the new
e c o n o m i c , s t a t i s t i c a l , a n d computer
i n s t i t u t e s in Leningrad, Moscow, and
Novosibirsk. The quantitative basis will be
present when and if the planning process is
fully adapted to the input-output technique
and away from directive Stalinist planning.
Though the companion transition to a
sounder management basis will probably be
more lengthy, the preconditions have also at
least in part been laid.4
Finally, the old supply-plan
physical-allocation machinery has not been
replaced by direct trading relations between
producers and consumers. At the same time,
there is evidence that the military sectors have

SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

A direct constraint on the efficient
operation of the Soviet industrial enterprise is
the pervasive military influence. There is the
visible Soviet military-industrial complex
headed by Mr. Ustinov, a member of the top
Party leadership, and the less visible state
organizations, which contribute to both
military and civilian programs but may be
mobilized by the military t o meet ongoing
needs.
Aside from the allocation of resources they
receive, the military have direct and indirect
influence over many activities. At the top, Mr.
U s t i n o v d i r e c t s t h e explicit Soviet
military-industrial complex including nine
ministries: Ministry of Defense, Ministry of
Aviation Industry, Ministry of Defense
Industry, Ministry of General Machine
Building, Ministry of Medium Machine
Building, Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry,
Ministry of Radio Industry, Ministry of
Electronics Industry, and Ministry of Machine
Building.8
The sphere of Mr. Ustinov's influence is
supplemented by many other state enterprises
outside the Ministry of Defense, which
contribute to military capability. These
include KGB troops, MVD and other
militarized forces, transportation facilities,
telecommunications and public health service,
and counterintelligence and security functions
of the Committee for State Security (KGB).9
These activities are largely convertible to
military activity with some consultation. For
example, the military journal, Red Star,10
reported trucks from construction projects
and kolkhozes and manpower called up at the
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time of the Czech invasion to strengthen the
Soviet military effort.
General of the Army S. S . Maryakhin,
Deputy Minister of Defense, USSR, Chief of
the Rear of the Armed Forces, noted in
exercises related to the Czech invasion:
. . .It is not a secret that, in order to
participate i n the exercise, it was
necessary to take from the national
economy, for a certain time period,
thousands of various units of powerful
equipment and motor transportation, and
recall from kolkhoz and suvkhoz fields, as
well as from industries and government
organizations, thousands of reservists.
And this at the time when the country
was in the midst of harvesting.
. . . It is comforting to realize that the
powerful and wealthy national economy
was able to allot all that was necessary for
the army, without any damage to the
fulfillment of the annual national
plans. 11

Soviet oil workers drilling for oil in Siberia.

I t is presumably this kind of activity that
led Mr. Aganbegian t o comment that the
military controlled 40 percent of the
economy. 12 This control could be used to
shift normally military production to civilian
needs. I t was reported, for example, that
agricultural equipment was being produced at
one time in Leningrad shipyards during the
late fifties. Moreover, it may represent a
weaker Soviet military logistic system than
often assumed. If the Soviet military was
compelled to call on the civilian economy t o
enable its forces to mobilize and move into
Czechoslovakia, the weak logistic system
interpretation is tenable. However, if the
military logistics system was adequate but the
military had the power to commandeer
civilian transport in order to ensure a
comfortable margin, another quite different
interpretation is supportable. Evidence from
Soviet sources does not permit a definitive
judgment on this question.
Cumbersome and inefficient as the military

Pipe mill plant near Moscow.
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the discussion of the Fifth Five-Year Plan.
This may have been an issue in the
elimination of the head of the State Planning
Commission, Nikolai Voznesensky , who,
according t o Khrushchev, "perished
physically" as a victim of the Stalinist "cult
of personality."15
Stalin's personal decision on the armament
for tanks, the choice among artillery pieces to
be manufactured and other technical
decisions on the eve of World War II
represented extreme interventions of the top
Party in the area of professional military
competence. This is the kind of intrusion
probably resented by economic and military
professionals alike.
Many changes have taken place since 1953
in the application of democratic centralism
and in the formulation of economic policies
and other matters. There are now at least four
groups within the elite who influence and
constrain policy decisions in the Soviet Union
and the Party: the military, the economic
planners/enterprise managers, the scientific
group oriented around the physical sciences in
the Academy of Sciences, and the Party
bureaucracy. The military have had perhaps
t h e closest approximation to actual
decisionmaking power within their own
sphere of professional interest, but even their
power in the post-Stalin period has
fluctuated.16
T h e new group of
economists/managers, indicated above,
appears to be approaching a position where it
may constrain and influence policy on
economic matters.
All these professional elite groups below
the top leadership have a common interest in
achieving a greater delegation of power from
the Party core in the decisionmaking process.
Each group can, presumably, agree that
within the guidelines provided by the political
leadership, policy can be more efficiently
implemented by those trained professionally,
formally or by experience to understand the
implications of alternative allocations of Party
policy guidelines. At the same time, each will
likewise tend to compete with the others for
priority in policy decisions involving a share
of limited resources to attain its particular
ends. This conflict of interest doubtless

administration and conversion of parts of the
economy may be, it represents a choice that is
diminishing in importance. As the strategic
systems expand in relative importance, the
choice between guns and growth is
increasingly limited to the stage of investment
rather than production, since the missile
support industry is not convertible to civilian
needs the way the conventional weapons
support industry is. To some degree, this
element o f nonconvertibility f r o m
production-supporting strategic systems to
civilian production applies to other elements
of military hardware as well.13 However, it is
among the technologically convertible sectors
that agricultural investment must compete. It
was presumably the military, Mr. Polyanskiy's
so-called "other people," who were diverting
production from agricultural equipment in
1967.
If change of a significant nature is
undertaken in the Soviet economy involving a
substantial expansion of the minority group
that controls effective power and a change in
the character of that minority from a
primarily political orientation to a more
technical economist/businessman character,
this change might in itself engender other
changes within the Soviet society.l4
What appears to be involved is a revision of
the concept of democratic centralism, the
guiding principle of decisionmaking by which
the Party develops policy and maintains
discipline. As originally conceived by Lenin, it
meant essentially that the members of the
Party would freely discuss the issues before a
decision was made, but, after resolution, all
were to adhere to the Central Party decision
without dissent; it also meant that the higher
body's decision must control those of any
lower body. As applied under Stalin, because
it barred his assumption of all power, the
democratic aspect of this concept was
muted, as illustrated in Nikita Khrushchev's
de-Stalinization speech in 1956. He noted
repeatedly the lack of participation in
decisions by even the minority elite forming
the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. An
outstanding example of this restrictive
Stalinist application of democratic centralism
in the formulation of economic policy was
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hampers their mutual quest for a broader
delegation of power within the Party
guidelines of policy. And all of them—those
within the elite groups and those at the
pinnacle of Party power itself—must be aware
that the decisionmaking power desired may
be diluted in the process of implementation in
each of these groups. There has been
perceived a rising new generation of younger
leaders allied in principle in the pursuit of a
broader delegation of power or a more liberal
interpretation of the rule of democratic
centralism in Soviet Party affairs.17 For the
economist/management group, the
establishment of indirect controls in the
economy would be an implied expression of
this kind of delegation of power. The
generational problem for the Soviet leaders
may have its implications for change. A
leading Soviet economist among the
modernizers is said to have commented that
he could talk professionally only t o colleagues
under 35 or over 65, thus eliminating the
Stalinist generation. The young economists
are increasing in numbers and influence.
Likewise, the generational change will be a
factor: "Thus, our industry is on the eve of a
big change. The administration is being taken
over by the young."18
The surfacing of countervailing groups
points to a new political situation inside the
Soviet Union: the emergence of pluralism
within the Soviet elite stimulated by differing
views on proper resource allocation. This
phenomenon is most vividly illustrated by the
Soviet military and their interaction with
other groups. Thus the resource allocation
problem as it affects defense may create
differences not only between the military and
other groups but may create an even more
complex situation: an alliance of some
political, economic, and military leaders on
one side against a similar grouping on the
other. It is known that some military and
industrial leaders have joined forces in the
past because of a direct relation between the
development of heavy industry and its output
for the armed forces. Similarly, some political
and economic leaders have joined in opposing
a disproportionate allocation of resources to
defense and heavy industry because of its

effect on balanced economic growth and the
regime's popularity. Internal dissatisfaction of
the Soviet people, whose needs are being
neglected in any downgrading of light
industry, can affect their ability to produce
the sinews of national power. For this reason
the proponents of consumer light-industry
orientation have drawn the support of some
of the military leaders responsible for welfare
of men rather than weapons capabilities. (This
includes the tyl or the rear services
commanders, e.g., those responsible for
housing and supplying services and food to
army personnel. Since 1963 there has been a
significant improvement in Soviet military
housing and support facilities.)
The initial institutional differences between
the military and other groups have centered
on the size of the defense budget in relation
to other allocations. However, once the
overall defense budget decisions are made,
they surface differences between the military
leaders, depending on their particular
responsibilities, over the priorities that should
govern the allocation of the defense budget
among the several services. Thus, for example,
Marshal Krylov, when commander of Soviet
missile forces, has differed with Marshal
Chuikov, a former ground force commander,
on the thrust of Soviet defense expenditures.
(This has been reflected in the stress each has
placed on the importance of his own
command.) Another example relates to
differences between the Soviet military on the
priorities of missile defense. Although all can
agree that missile defense should get a bigger
allocation of resources, budget limitations can
give rise to differences on whether the
resources should go into developing missile
defense to defend population centers or into
developing the ground forces in the field.
The foregoing suggests that the Soviet
military are not a monolithic group in
unanimous opposition to other institutions.
Rather, their views are shaped by (a) the
particular command they may have at the
moment, (b) their war experience and age,
and (c) their training and education. These
factors can and do lead to differences within
the military that can serve as the basis for
segments of the military to join nonmilitary
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mark in World War II and have dominated
Soviet strategic thinking to date. The
younger, perhaps better-trained officers, are
now moving to the fore.
The issue of technocrats vs generalists has
also generated differences within the Soviet
armed forces. In response to younger
t e c h n i c a l specialists, the older Soviet
commanders have tried to justify the value of
their generalized command experience. This is
r e f l e c t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n General
Shtemenko's rationalization of the overriding
command advantage that a commander with
general experience has over a technically
trained officer.
The foregoing illustrates the development
of a pluralism within one elite—the military; it
is but another indication of a wider change on
the Soviet political scene involving other
groups. The cultural elite is involved in a
battle with other elites and within its own
ranks for a role in shaping the development of
Soviet society. In the main, its battle is with
the police and other reactionary forces over
professionalism and does not find expression
in the resource allocation debate directly.
Again, these cleavages and group interests
may be catalyzed if an economic crisis forces
hard decisions on the implications of the
Ninth Five-Year Plan.

Kreschchatik-Kiev's main street.

across institutional lines: a Soviet commander
with generalized ground force experience may
be given command of a specialized branch or
service, such as the long range missile or air
defense forces. His views are then likely to be
shaped by the requirements of that command.
(This may be compared to the influence of
regional requirements on a Party leader's
views even if he previously served in Moscow
and should put the center's interests above
local interests.) Thus Marshal Krylov's
differences with Chuikov cited earlier have
occurred despite Krylov's earlier career as a
ground force commander.
Past war experience has shaped the views of
the older Soviet commanders. Given the
current and future military problems likely to
face the Soviets, these views have been
challenged by younger Soviet officers as being
out of date. The challenge also relates to the
function of age. The Soviet military
establishment seems to be passing from the
hands of the older marshals who made their

DYNAMICS OF SOVIET SOCIETY

Brezhnev's choices on weapons and control
should be placed in the broader context of
the changing system within which the Soviet
Party may be expected to change. There are
three possible lines of development in the
years ahead: (1) a return to the essential
features of the Stalinist system of priorities,
control and administration; (2) a continuation
of the equivocal, modified Stalinist system
devised and used by the post-Khrushchev
leadership; (3) significant changes in the
S o v i e t s y s t e m resulting in more
professionalism and pluralism in the
decisionmaking elite, and a shift t o optimal
planning and market-simulating management
in the economy.
As to the first, in the light of current
conservatism in the Soviet Union one might
50

ask, "Why should we not write off the
economic reforms and political pluralism as a
temporary thaw in the continuous pattern of
Stalinist development and expect the Soviets
to revert fully to the old system of Joseph
Stalin?" This prospect seems unlikely on
peering into the future. A full return to
Stalinism does not appear possible without
t h e t e r r o r and perhaps without the
duplication of the original circumstances of a
primitive, developing economy led by a
personage such as Joseph Stalin. In spite of
the resurgence of Stalinist methods in
repressing i n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d creative
artists—writers in particular, and those who
press the civil rights of individuals and
minorities, such as General Grigorenko and
Pave1 Litvinov—it is not expected that the
current leadership will unleash the security
forces in the style of the 1930's. The author
does not believe that the Stalinist terror could
be reinstated again, nor that the leaders of a
complex, more modern Soviet state could or
would pay the price of depriving their society
of its professionals and thinkers. This simply
would not conform t o the objective rationale
of the current Soviet leadership. Indeed
Leonid Brezhnev was careful not to criticize
or to praise the Stalinist system in his major
address to the Party Congress.19
The second, continued strategic-military
emphasis with institutional stagnation or
economic immobilism, an equivocal modified
Stalinist system, is possible but increasingly
less likely because the probable pressure for
change from poor economic performance as
compared with economic potential is likely to
increase. As t h e economy becomes
progressively worse in satisfying felt
needs—perhaps dramatically worse if all
cyclical factors simultaneously trough for
supply and peak for demand—that pressure
will continue t o grow.
Major changes in the future will be built on
the changes that have taken place to date. The
view of the author is that significant changes
have been made in planning and management
underpinning economic reform. A new
professional planning cadre has been
developed at the research organizations and
institutes throughout the USSR. This cadre
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represents a capability for taking over the
implementation of new mathematical and
statistical techniques at the center and in the
enterprises. Moreover, a new managerial class
has been called for by the Soviet leadership,
and some potentially significant changes have
been made in the choices of key managerial
personnel, training, and evaluation. Similarly,
the beginnings of change in the information
a n d r e p o r t i n g system have occurred
particularly with the transition in planning for
the Ninth Five-Year Plan using the 1966
i n put—output table. These changes are
significant as they represent the major
preconditions for a shift t o optimal planning
and management simulating a market in the
Soviet economy.
It is true, of course, that beyond the
preconditions, changes in Soviet economic
planning and management have been slow in
adoption. Two central problems appear to
impede the reforms: (1) the release of
resources from the military programs to
civilian activities—so central t o improved
e c o n o m i c performance—has not been
forthcoming (indeed, the military share has
been rising) and (2) the delegation of
decisionmaking from the Central and
Regional Party and military organs, implied in
Soviet discussions of optimal planning and
management simulating a market, has been
resisted and largely frustrated.
What will break this immobility and allow
the significant foreseeable changes to come
about? One possibility is a shift in Soviet
defense policy, from the present pursuit of
parity with or superiority to the US in the
nuclear race. This could come about if the
Soviet leaders, faced with the incredibly
costly prospect of matching the US Multiple
Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle
(MIRV), decided that, in view of their weak
economic position, they would opt to
deemphasize defense and turn some resources
from military to growth-stimulating sectors. It
is equally possible that Soviet response to the
MIRV will be to up the defense ante. It is also
extremely unlikely that the military will,
under any circumstances, voluntarily give up
their large share of the budget.
Nevertheless, there is still the strong

the Ninth Five-Year Plan), to revert to the old
priority for defense. This, it would seem,
would be the logical path to follow in order
to maximize the Soviet position vis-a-vis the
US.
This kind of reasoning assumes, however,
that the Soviet leaders accord sole priority to
the national position with the US. It ignores a
crucial fact that enters the reasoning of the
present leaders--their own power position in
the Soviet Union. Who is to say that five years
hence, after allowing their control of the
Soviet system to move into the hands of the
modernists in the search for economic
well-being, they could regain their leadership
positions and return to the present priorities?
The remnants of the Stalinist power
structure in the military and elsewhere
undoubtedly fear that any temporary loss of
power will be irreversible once the trend to
modernism is allowed to take hold. Their
position in the hierarchy governs their
position on economic reform. The struggle for
distribution of power among the contending
institutions is at the same time the engine for
change and the source of the stagnation which
has immobilized the entire Soviet system.
Decisions postponing further buildup in
Soviet strategic systems, the SS-9 and SS-11,
and a resumption in military manpower
demobilization may be the decisions which
trigger more far-reaching changes under the
otherwise conservative term of Leonid
Brezhnev in the office of Party General
Secretary.

likelihood, as noted, of continued economic
deterioration. Economic crisis could force the
s h i f t f r o m d e f e n s e expenditures to
growth-stimulating ones that would not
otherwise be made. In other words, the shift
from defense might be resisted on policy
grounds but be taken as the only viable
economic alternative. Economic crisis could
likewise bring about a shift of control to the
economic planners and managers in the quest
for recovery.
In such a situation, the changes that will
necessarily ensue will not be minor changes.
Mere tampering with the system, further
modified Stalinism, will not produce the
desired results, as the experience of the past
few years has demonstrated. To overcome the
inertia of the system, major changes will have
to be made in allocation of resources and
distribution of control.
The cost of equivocation is high and rising.
T o bring any civilian projects, e.g., the West
Siberian petroleum development, into
production substantial integrated investment
outlays over long periods of time are required.
Similarly a new generation of weapons may
require not only long gestation periods but a
significant change of interrelated resource
commitments. To simultaneously undertake
overcommitments within and between these
kinds of areas invites a proliferation of
u n f i n i s h e d projects and unsatisfactory
performance.
To continue the dual existence of the old
modified Stalinist system of planning and
management while developing but not
implementing a more sophisticated planning
and management system is expensive and
potentially counterproductive. The painful
choice among resource claimants and between
the old and new systems of planning and
management may in time be perceived by the
Soviet top leadership as less costly than the
increasing cost of equivocation and muddling
through.
Is it not logical, one might ask, for the
Soviet leadership to shift temporarily to
growth preference in resource allocation and
planning/management and, then, with the
additional resources and strength generated
through these measures (e.g., for the period of
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